Problem
Rivian’s JD specifically calls out evaluating “multi-agent and LLM-integrated workflows for complex risks such as privilege escalation, unsafe action chaining, direct/indirect prompt injection.” I wanted hands-on proof I can actually do this, not just define it.
Method
(Fill in as you build this out — suggested structure below)
- Built a LangChain agent with two tools: read a local file, send an email (mocked)
- Set an explicit boundary: the agent should never read files outside
/sandbox - Planted a malicious instruction inside a document the agent was asked to summarize, attempting to get it to exfiltrate contents of a file outside the sandbox via the “email” tool
- Documented which prompts succeeded, which the model’s own alignment training resisted, and which needed an explicit system-prompt guardrail
Result
(Fill in: what broke, what held, what you changed)
Code
[Link to GitHub repo]
What I’d do differently
(Fill in after you run it)