Problem

Rivian’s JD specifically calls out evaluating “multi-agent and LLM-integrated workflows for complex risks such as privilege escalation, unsafe action chaining, direct/indirect prompt injection.” I wanted hands-on proof I can actually do this, not just define it.

Method

(Fill in as you build this out — suggested structure below)

  1. Built a LangChain agent with two tools: read a local file, send an email (mocked)
  2. Set an explicit boundary: the agent should never read files outside /sandbox
  3. Planted a malicious instruction inside a document the agent was asked to summarize, attempting to get it to exfiltrate contents of a file outside the sandbox via the “email” tool
  4. Documented which prompts succeeded, which the model’s own alignment training resisted, and which needed an explicit system-prompt guardrail

Result

(Fill in: what broke, what held, what you changed)

Code

[Link to GitHub repo]

What I’d do differently

(Fill in after you run it)